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HS2 at the crossroads – what next?


In the wake of the publication of the report of the Oakervee Review, Chia-Lin Chen looks at what international experience tells us about whether HS2 should finally go ahead


Intended to provide a strategic rail network for Britain’s future, the High Speed Two (HS2) project is under continuing critical reconsideration as a result of the dramatic escalation in its cost. Drawing on the findings of the Oakervee Review,1 announced in February 2020, and informed by international experiences, this article considers whether HS2 should, or should not, finally go ahead.
	Escalating costs and severe delays appear to be a fact of life for every mega-transport infrastructure scheme. HS2 is no exception. The latest figure for the cost of its Y-shaped network rose alarmingly to £106 billion in January 2020, while further serious delays are anticipated. Last year, a written statement (​https:​/​​/​www.parliament.uk​/​business​/​publications​/​written-questions-answers-statements​/​written-statement​/​Commons​/​2019-09-03​/​HCWS1809​/​​) to Parliament showed that completion of phases 1 and 2 was expected between 2028 and 2031, and 2035 and 2040, respectively.
	Defending the decision last August to set up an independent review when Prime Minister Boris Johnson took office, Transport Secretary Grant Shapps stressed ‘getting the facts right’ and the importance of asking for more data on options. However, there is a sense of déjà vu here. This latest review concludes with strong advice against cancelling the scheme, awakening the debate raging during the development stages of HS2. Disagreement on a range of issues, both ‘for’ and ‘against’, is clearly depicted in the late Professor Sir Peter Hall’s ‘HS2: The Great Divide’.2 It is worth reviewing the major reasons underlying the need for HS2, and exploring methods for delivering a long-planned vision of such great national importance.
	Why HS2? Rail capacity is arguably the main reason. The UK has long underinvested in rail transport, relying on the legacy of Victorian investment. Following the Beeching Report in 1963,3 the national rail network was reduced by 25% (20,328 kilometres in 1963, 14,634 kilometres in 2018), while passenger demand increased from 800 million in 1963 to 1,356 million in 2010, with the addition of a further 400 million by 2018. During this time, passenger-kilometres rose from 51.5 billion to 67.7 billion.
	Modern inter-city high-speed rail has been developed in two approaches, namely newly built lines and upgraded lines. In mainland Europe, pioneers in high-speed rail (HSR) lines, notably France and then Germany, took the former approach, because conventional railways were built ‘more cheaply, with far sharper curves and frequent at-grade crossings that severely limited operating speeds’,4 which led to them developing their new HSR lines from the 1960s onwards. The UK, where building new lines was an impossible financial task,5 adopted the latter approach by upgrading existing mainlines to operate, thanks to the higher-standard Victorian engineering achievements since inception, at maximum speeds of 200 kilometres per hour – including InterCity 125 high-speed trains (HSTs) on the Great Western mainline (London-Cardiff) in 1976, InterCity225 HSTs on the East Coast mainline (London-Edinburgh) in 1981, and the Class 390 Pendolino trains on the West Coast mainline (London-Glasgow) in 2008.
	Over the past 40 years, the existing overstretched network has served three types of service – inter-city express, regional/commuting, and freight – by prioritising express travel within the capacity limitation, resulting in bottleneck issues for commuting services and under-developed rail freight potential. HS2 could serve inter-city express rail demand and relieve existing network capacity, thus improving regional/commuting and freight rail services.
	As an alternative to building new rail lines to expand capacity, HS2 opponents have proposed the lengthening of trains, claiming that the benefit-cost ratio of this approach would be less expensive. However, such analyses fail to take rail infrastructure into account from a strategic planning perspective, which has not been well understood or widely communicated to the public.
	The second major reason for the introduction of HS2 is its transformative effect in unleashing urban regeneration potential and rebalancing a persistent North-South divide. There is a caveat here, however, because HS2 alone will not address this divide.6 The wider impacts of HSR on regional rebalancing has long been debateable because of mixed identified results.7 More recent evidence perpetuates the debate. From Japan Wetwitoo and Kato8 suggest that the economic productivity of peripheral areas might be increased through the introduction of HSR lines, while evidence from China suggests that the impacts of HSR effects vary with city size: cities with a larger population benefit more.9
	As illustrated by Blonk,10 editor of the classic Transport and Regional Development: An International Handbook, transport can be an agent for decline as well as growth if it exposes a place to outside competition. Conventionally, the debate on regional development has largely drawn on the perspectives of ‘new economic geography’11 to explain imperfect competition and the resulting widened inequality. These approaches have neglected the role of strategic planning and intervention in addressing polarisation. Empirical evidence from the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region (merged with Picardy as part of a new region Hauts-de-France) in France has shown that, although a TGV node and network will not automatically favour HSR cities and regions, proactive and strategic planning with a supporting policy and governance structure to extend the benefits of HSR to wider regions could reduce regional inequality.12
	Similarly, in the UK the introduction of domestic Channel Tunnel Rail Link (HS1) services aimed to benefit Kent county more widely after the arrival of HS1.7
	At the urban level, an HSR station located near an existing urban centre is crucial in contributing to urban revival and development. Renowned examples include Lille Europe and Lyon Part-Dieu in France, Liège-Guillemins in Belgium, and London’s King’s Cross/St Pancras and Stratford in the UK, which significantly inspire the design of HS2 stations in Birmingham, Manchester, and Leeds. Attempts to change the initial HS2 station from Sheffield Meadowhall to Sheffield station reflect an awareness of the importance of strategic planning in linking HSR and urban (re)development. Similarly, despite the complexity of the Euston station reconstruction to provide an HS2 terminal station, the Oakervee Review panel regards Euston station as an important part of realising the benefits of HS2, suggesting that the link between Old Oak Common and Euston should be kept and that Old Oak should act as the temporary London terminus before the central Euston station is complete (p.110 of the Oakervee Review report1).
	Equally important for rebalancing inequality is spreading the benefit into a wider region beyond a transport hub. Proactive measures, such as those of the Northern Powerhouse and Northern Powerhouse Rail, and improvements in connectivity (​https:​/​​/​www.wmca.org.uk​/​what-we-do​/​hs2​/​connectivity​/​" \o "Connectivity​) in the West Midlands, help to enhance HS2 to benefit wider regions. Greengauge 21’s Beyond HS213 study urges a long-term rail strategy for Britain, addressing such issues as capacity, connectivity, productivity, regional economic disparity, international trade, carbon reduction, and air quality.
	Moreover, the EU Interreg 4B SINTROPHER project (Sustainable Integrated Transport Options for Peripheral European Regions), which ran from 2009 to 2015 and brought together seven regions in five countries in North West Europe, highlights the need for connectivity and regeneration in remote locations to avoid peripheralisation of places bypassed by major transport network – especially high-speed rail.
	The project, which was focused on poorly connected regions – including Fylde Coast (UK), Valenciennes (France), West Flanders (Belgium), North Hesse (Germany), Arnhem-Nijmegen (Netherlands), and Saar-Moselle (France-Germany cross-border region) – developed, through technological innovation, new regional tram-based transport systems that connect seamlessly to major rail or air hubs, using, where possible, existing rail infrastructure. And innovative transport appraisal tools were proposed to assist decision-making processes and enable consideration of a wide range of criteria beyond cost-benefit analyses.
	With the exception of war-time planning, the British political economy has long shaped the country’s transport investment decision-making, dominated by value-for-money and cost-benefit analysis approaches. The extent to which a strategic planning vision can rebalance Britain through HSR may be fully appreciated, but the government’s capacity to make it happen is questionable. As Transport Secretary Grant Shapps reflected outside a Centre for Policy Studies fringe event at the 2019 Tory party conference, ‘One of the reasons why we are perhaps seen as being poor at delivering the things that the panellists discussed is because we don’t prioritise and don’t understand … these big infrastructure projects well enough’.14
	In addition, municipalities’ financial power has been limited by central control from Whitehall, resulting in difficulties for local initiatives in undertaking integrated regeneration strategies, especially for those disadvantaged, ‘left-behind’ places where the prospects of success for a regeneration vision may appear unconvincing and it is thus difficult to prove strategic need under the constraints of the mainstream value-for-money model.
	In light of the escalating cost of HS2, strategic planning to integrate transport and development is crucial to reducing the financial burdens at later stages of operation. As the Department for Transport has assumed that HS2 will be publicly funded upfront, private financing or third-party contributions (for example business rate measures and joint venture agreements) could possibly reduce the capital demand from the taxpayer and offer value for money, according to conditions specified in the Department for Transport’s Outline Business Case. Section 4: Financial Case; i.e. ‘creating the right planning, land use and economic environment will be essential to bringing forward development’.15 Business rate supplements have been included as part of the Crossrail funding package in London, for example. Capitalising on increasing land value is another option.
	However, the wider impacts on land use and development are not yet completely appreciated. The Oakervee Review highlights that the current economic case for HS2 does not fully align with the strategic case, and land use is assumed to be fixed over time, suggesting that further work is needed to understand the potential impact of HS2 on the number and location of homes and jobs, with land use benefits that could be effectively quantified (section 11 of the Oakervee Review report1). There is therefore an urgent need to disentangle the relationship between transport connectivity and spatial-economic restructuring, and thus develop innovative reforms in infrastructure financing and taxation policy that are beneficial not only to the HS2 project, but also in addressing other intra-regional transport needs. Meanwhile, additional planning measures should be developed to address any negative social impacts such as displacement made by land use change. 
	In Great Planning Disasters,16 the late Sir Peter Hall classified two types of planning disaster: positive and negative. Unlike a positive disaster, negative disasters are characterised by projects that remain incomplete, despite investment of time and money. Whether HS2 is a planning disaster or a planning success depends on whether strategic planning and policies are implemented at multiple levels, with innovative tools to exploit developmental opportunities during a long-term development process. As experience in other countries has shown, further inter-city and improved intra-regional networks, as well as non-transport intervention, would also be crucial for achieving the transformation vision of HS2.
	Now is not the time to dawdle and dither – Japan has enjoyed the benefits of HSR since the 1960s and France since the early 1980s. The longer the delay, the more uncertainty there will be, resulting in even higher costs. It is time to ask: can the UK afford the cost of inaction by halting a policy of national importance planned a decade ago? It is especially relevant to reflect, as Hall did in the 1980s, that ‘there is a time for doing very little, and a time when only positive – even unpopular – action will be right’.
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